In a recent Gazette column, I quoted William & Mary graduate Michael Holtzman about what motivated him to become the architect of the public relations campaign that secured the hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympics and Paralympic Games for Beijing.
The hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympics was a key moment for the Olympics movement and for China, according to news reports. It signaled the country’s growing stature and readiness to be a major global player.
To my question about what motivated him to help China to be the host, Holtzman said he “believed that engaging China would be the best strategy for them to play a constructive role in the world.”
Alas, today, China is considered a rival to the West. It has surpassed the United States as the biggest economy, and its military ambitions are unknown.
What is known and is of great concern to the U.S. is China’s effort and political will to employ public diplomacy and a broadcasting toolkit to wage a narrative competition.
To better understand Beijing’s playbook for engaging with foreign leaders through information influence and public diplomacy, earlier this year the U.S. Senate invited Samantha Custer, director of policy analysis at William & Mary’s Global Research Institute, to give a testimony at the meeting of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.
Reflecting on a decade work of AidData research that Custer had conducted, she explained that China has the financial means and political will to employ formidable public diplomacy and informational tools to engage in narrative competition.
“We live in a world of contested narratives,” Custer said. “China’s approach to public diplomacy is informed by the desire to ‘win the narrative.’”
According to Custer, Chinese and U.S. leaders have their own preferred narratives. More than empty words, these narratives jockey for position with traditional and social media in public and private discourse, between great powers and with third countries.
“In an era of intensified geopolitical competition,” Custer said, “economic and military might is insufficient for a great power — be that China or the United States — to get the outcomes it wants without cooperation with other countries.”
The target audience of interest is not limited to advanced economies or historical military allies but an expanded set of low and middle income countries. These countries have more options to guard their strategic autonomy and navigate great power competition by playing both sides in pursuit of better deals.
According to Custer, the Chinese leaders have internalized some critical. lessons. “It is not merely about warm and fuzzy reputation management but about accumulating invaluable currency to weaken rivals and shore up power at home.”
Beijing has multiple objectives for its narrative competition, Custer said in her testimony to Congress.
If people in target countries and their leaders admire China’s economic success and believe that Beijing is a beneficial partner in their countries’ development, this generates demand to buy, trade and also creates willing partners to supply critical raw material, energy and transportation tools to fuel China’s economy.
But there is more to it.
As Custer noted, “Beijing’s ability to inform, control and co-opt the narrative is critical to win support for its positions at the United Nations, and at various regional forums. It inoculates the CCP, the ruling Communist Party, against criticism that ferments discontent at home. China’s narrative projects strength to check the influence of competitors like the United States.”
Frank Shatz is a Williamsburg resident. He is the author of “Reports from a Distant Place,” the compilation of his selected columns. The book is available at Bruton Parish Shop and on Amazon.com.